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MOVE:
Philadelphia’s Forgotten Bombing
Charles Abraham
“Philadelphia Free the MOVE 9 Forum” by Joe Piette is licensed under CC BY-NC-SA 2.0
On May 13, 1985, the city of Philadelphia erupted into flames. Under the orders of Mayor Wilson Goode, the 
Philadelphia Police Department dropped a bomb onto the row house containing MOVE, a cult-like organization, 
on Osage Avenue in West Philadelphia. The resulting fire killed eleven people, including five children, and burned 
down sixty-one houses. By examining newspaper articles on MOVE, the bombing by the Philadelphia Police, and 
the public’s response, this paper investigates how Mayor Goode was able to continue his political career and how 
this bombing has faded into obscurity outside of the city. The media’s attitude and reporting on MOVE, the city’s 
lack of connection with MOVE’s beliefs, and the efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing 
have caused this tragedy to become largely forgotten.
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In a fortified row house in West Philadelphia, a bomb 
dropped by Philadelphia Police killed eleven MOVE 
members, including five children, and burned down sixty-
one her houses after a lengthy standoff between the two 
groups. MOVE is a cult-like organization which eschewed 
technology, medicine and western clothing, where members 
lived communally, ate raw food, left garbage on their yards, 
and proselytized with a loudspeaker, frustrating the residents 
of Osage Avenue. The MOVE bombing, remembered as 
“May 13, 1985” in West Philadelphia, was the first time a 
U.S. city bombed itself, and it could have been a pivotal 
moment in the mayoral reign of Wilson Goode and for 
the city of brotherly love. Instead, the bombing has faded 
into obscurity, with only minimal consequences for the 
city government and for the city. Public antipathy and the 
efforts of the city government to move on from the bombing, 
revealed and even enabled by media reporting, have caused 
this tragedy to become largely forgotten.1
MOVE: The Organization
Vincent Leaphart founded the American Christian Move-
ment for Life, later shortened to MOVE, in 1972 in West 
Philadelphia and changed his name to John Africa. MOVE 
was primarily a black organization, although white people 
could join as well. As an anti-establishment and anti-tech-
nology group, its members ate a diet of only raw fruits, vege-
     1 For further reading on cults in America, see Willa Appel, Cults in America: 
Programmed for Paradise (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983), which 
discusses the phenomenon of cults and how one is indoctrinated or breaks out of 
a cult. For further reading on African Americans in mid-20th century America see 
Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics and Prosperity: Black Americans and White 
Institutions, 1940-1975 (New York: Pantheon, 1978) or Annette Gordon-Reed, ed., 
Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), which discuss how African Americans were treated by the police and 
in the court as well as other white-dominated institutions during this period. For 
more on MOVE, see J.M. Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts: 
MOVE as Revolutionary Black Humanism,” The Black Scholar 32, no.1 (Spring 
2002): 11-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41068961, which argues MOVE was a 
radical and religious group that exemplified revolutionary black humanist thinking. 
For more on the effect of the media on the perception of MOVE, see Kimberly 
Sanders and Judson Jeffries, “Framing MOVE: A Press’ Complicity in the Murder 
of Women and Children in the City of (Un) Brotherly Love,” Journal of African 
American Studies 17, no. 4 (December 2013): 566-586, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s12111-013-9252-7, which discusses how press coverage led to antipathy towards 
the MOVE organization. For more on the MOVE bombing and its aftermath, see 
Robin Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction: The City of Philadelphia versus 
MOVE (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Hizkias Assefa, Extremist 
Groups and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia (New York: 
Praeger, 1988); Margot Harry, “Attention MOVE—This is America!” Sage Journals 
28, no. 4 (April 1987): 5-28, https://doi.org/10.1177/030639688702800402; 
Georgia A. Persons, “The Philadelphia MOVE Incident as an Anomaly in Models 
of Mayoral Leadership,” Phylon 48, no. 4 (December 1987): 249-260, https://doi.
org/10.2307/274482; or John Anderson and Hilary Hevenor, Burning Down the 
House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York: Norton, 1987), which 
all discuss the bombing and how it affected Philadelphia and the city government. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer reported on MOVE and the bombing from 1985-
1987. Temple University Library Special Collections houses the records of the 
Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission regarding the MOVE bombing and 
its antecedents. 
tables, nuts, and eggs; used no medicine or western clothing; 
disposed of their garbage in the yard; and used outhouses 
instead of conventional toilets. The children of MOVE were 
not allowed to attend school and had never eaten cooked 
food or watched television. These were the first “pure” 
members of MOVE: they were raised to never be exposed 
to the corrupting influences of social and political institu-
tions. Members protested outside of zoos and pet stores, 
which often led to arrests though the police did not believe 
MOVE was even potentially violent during the early 1970s.2
The MOVE  bombing, 
remembered as “May 13, 1985“ 
in West Philadelphia, 
was the first time a U.S. city 
bombed itself.
The other residents of Powelton Village did not hold a 
great opinion of MOVE, which lived communally in three 
townhouses in the neighborhood. Powelton Village, located 
near Drexel University and the University of Pennsylvania, 
was a diverse and tolerant community and a haven for 
political activists. In 1976, neighbors began complaining 
about children playing in the yard without diapers and 
in unsanitary conditions. The complaints of Powelton 
residents’ and MOVE’s campaign against police brutality 
caused the Philadelphia Police Department to set up 24-
hour surveillance on the MOVE townhouses, fueling their 
belief that they were being targeted by the police. The next 
year, MOVE members began to sit out on the porch holding 
rifles, wearing berets, and using loudspeakers to lecture their 
neighbors. MOVE already held a reputation as a radical 
black organization, much like the Black Panthers, because 
of MOVE’s emergence during the “Black Power” era. Many 
people in Philadelphia believed the public display of weapons 
to be the start of the organization becoming more militant.3
Tensions between the city and MOVE began to rise as 
neighbors in Powelton continued complaining about 
MOVE’s actions and as the police department’s surveillance 
began to infuriate the organization. Between 1977 and 
1978, MOVE placed bomb-timing devices, though no 
explosives, in several hotels across the nation as well as in 
     2 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 27-29; Sanders and Jeffries, 
“Framing MOVE,” 568; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 
13; Jack N. Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles to Administrative Responsibility: 
Lessons of the MOVE Disaster,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 10, no. 
1 (Winter 1991): 2-3, https://doi.org/10.2307/3325510; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 
14-15. 
     3 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 29-31; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 3-4; Floyd-Thomas, “The Burning of Rebellious Thoughts,” 11-21. 
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London.4 These devices were left with threatening letters 
stating that MOVE would strike for real unless Philadelphia 
stopped its harassment. The organization had begun a feud 
with then-Mayor Frank Rizzo, who had previously served as 
Philadelphia’s Police Commissioner and run for mayor on 
a law-and-order campaign. MOVE’s residency in Powelton 
Village came to a head in 1978 after an agreement between 
the organization and the city made on May 5 disintegrated. 
The city and MOVE had agreed that the city would end 
the blockade and within 90 days MOVE members would 
relocate to a residence outside the city. MOVE saw the city 
as the center of the societal corruption they sought to end 
and stayed past the 90-day limit. While several organizations 
active in Powelton Village at the time were either pro-MOVE 
or supported negotiation with MOVE to allow them to stay 
in the neighborhood, MOVE and the police engaged in a 
protracted firefight resulting in the death of one policeman, 
Officer James Ramp, and the sentencing of nine MOVE 
members to jail for the officer’s death.5 
The policy of non-confrontation 
and avoidance proved 
ineffective, and in 1984 the 
Philadelphia Police began to 
plan a course of action against 
MOVE.
After being forced out of Powelton Village, MOVE took 
up residence in a row house on Osage Avenue in Cobbs 
Creek, West Philadelphia. At first, the organization and the 
residents of Osage Avenue coexisted peacefully. In time, 
however, tensions began to as lifestyle differences emerged 
and the neighbors began complaining. MOVE removed the 
flea collars off of their neighbors’ pets, collected and fed wild 
animals, built pigeon coops, and left their refuse outside 
in their yard. Most distressing to Osage Avenue residents 
was that the MOVE children appeared to be malnourished 
and rummaged through their trash looking for food. The 
neighbors were told Wilson Goode would help them after 
he had become mayor, but in late 1983 after the mayoral 
election, MOVE began to use bullhorns and loudspeakers to 
harass their neighbors.6 
    4 While MOVE left these letters and devices across the nation and interna-
tionally, they were still only an organization local to Philadelphia and were not 
expanding nationally.
     5 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 30-32; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 16; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 20-37. Nine members of MOVE were 
convicted in the shooting of Officer James Ramp during the 1978 shootout 
with the police and were sentenced with thirty to one hundred years in prison. 
Thesemembers are known collectively as “The MOVE 9.”
     6 Assefa, Extremist Groups, 102-108; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles” 5.
MOVE believed Mayor Goode had the ability to release 
the jailed MOVE 9 members, and they knew if they 
began to harass residents of Osage Avenue—a middle-
class neighborhood and the bedrock of Goode’s political 
support—the city would have to pay attention to them. 
Despite MOVE holding the block hostage, Goode used 
apolicy of “appeasement, non-confrontation and avoidance,” 
attempting to avoid conflict in any way possible.7 City 
Operating Departments—Health, Water, Human Services, 
Streets, and Licences and Inspections—were barred by city 
policy from carrying out their responsibilities at the MOVE 
row house. City officials believed that once MOVE members 
realized the city was ignoring them, they would either change 
their belligerent behavior or leave the city. The policy of
non-confrontation and avoidance proved ineffective, and in 
1984 the Philadelphia Police began to plan a course of action 
against MOVE, one of the first signs of what was to come.8
May 13, 1985
Mayor Goode told the police he needed a plan of action 
against MOVE in the spring of 1985. He wanted to explore 
the possibilities of arresting some MOVE members and 
obtaining a court order to hold the children. MOVE began 
fortifying their row house in earnest in the fall of 1984 and 
the winter of 1985, building a bunker made of railroad 
ties, logs, and steel plates on the top of their house; they 
used similar material to fortify the walls. In April 1985, 
they announced with bullhorns their intentions to kill the 
mayor or any police officer who approached the fortified 
house. Neighbors threatened to take matters into their own 
hands after claiming to have seen men with rifles on the 
roof and in the bunker of the house. On the morning of 
May 13, 1985, the police attempted to serve warrants for 
the arrests of four MOVE members. These warrants were for 
misdemeanor charges and primarily intended to get them 
out of the neighborhood. Mayor Goode required that any 
officers involved in the 1978 shooting not be involved in 
the operation on Osage Avenue, but several of those officers 
were present in the assault force. At 5:30 a.m. outside the 
MOVE row house, police used a bullhorn to announce the 
names of the members to be arrested for illegal possession 
of explosives and terroristic threats and gave the members 
fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE refused. Police insertion 
teams then entered the houses on either side. In response, 
MOVE shot at the police force from inside. Over the next 
hour and a half, the Philadelphia police fired over 10,000 
     7 “Excerpts from Commission’s Report on Bombing,” New York Times, March 
7, 1986.
     8 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 32, 82-85; Nagel, “Psychological 
Obstacles,” 7; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 110-111; Persons, “The Philadelphia 
MOVE Incident,” 255.
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rounds of ammunition on the row house and used explosives 
to blow holes in the walls. By 10:40 a.m., the front of the 
house was destroyed, but the fortifications MOVE installed 
in the winter had held, preventing the police from seizing the 
house. When it became clear their tactics had failed, Mayor 
Goode announced during a televised press conference he 
would take the house by any means necessary.9
After the press conference, the police sought another way 
to force the eleven people out of the house that included 
the use of explosives. They began assembling an explosive 
entry device around 4:30 p.m., and around thirty minutes 
later, Mayor Goode approved the use of the entry device. At 
5:27 p.m., the police dropped an explosive package from a 
helicopter onto the bunker of the house. When the bomb 
exploded, it did not remove the bunker; rather, it ignited 
a gasoline tank. Instead of trying to contain the resulting 
blaze, the police and fire commissioners let the bunker burn. 
It was not until 6:32 p.m. that the fire department turned 
on its hoses, and it was not until 9:30 p.m. that they took 
more active steps to contain the fire. The fire raged on until 
11:41 p.m., engulfing 61 homes, damaging 110 additional 
houses, killing John Africa and the ten other occupants of 
the MOVE house, five of them children, and leaving 250 
men, women, and children homeless.10
Response to the MOVE Bombing
The bombing of the MOVE row house should have been 
a pivotal event in the history of Philadelphia, showing the 
incompetence of city officials in an explosive finale. Yet, after 
the bombing, Mayor Goode and the Philadelphia Police 
Department received support from around the country. The 
Los Angeles Police Chief at the time, Daryl Gates, defended 
the use of an explosive device, declaring it “a sound tactic.” 
Gates also stated that Mayor Goode had “provided some of 
the finest leadership [he had] ever seen from any politician” 
and that he hoped Mayor Goode “ran for national office.” 
Michael Nutter, then an assistant to a city councilman, 
said “[MOVE] is a group of people whose philosophy is 
based on conflict and confrontation.” Roy Innis, who was 
the chairman of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 
called Mayor Goode’s handling of the crisis “heroic.” Tom 
Cremans, the former director of Accuracy Systems Inc., 
which sells munitions to police departments, said “the police 
exercised remarkable restraint in not using the device earlier.” 
However, the bomb squads of many cities were reluctant to 
    9 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 87-94; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 111-113; 
Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 6-8.
     10 Wagner-Pacifici, Discourse and Destruction, 95-96; Assefa, Extremist Groups, 
113; Nagel, “Psychological Obstacles,” 9.
comment on the incident, not wishing to criticize their 
fellow officers.11 
Despite those speaking in favor of the mayor and the 
Philadelphia Police Department, not all law enforcement 
officers were complimentary of Philadelphia’s handling of 
the MOVE crisis. The director of the American Federation 
of Police, Gerald Arenberg, believed “They broke every rule 
in the book” when it came to their handling of the incident.
James Fife, a police lieutenant in New York City, described it 
by saying, “They burned down the village to save the village” 
before adding that the actions taken by the Philadelphia 
Police Department were “really unheard of.” Arenberg stated 
the Philadelphia police “just weren’t using all the equipment 
available to any modern police department.” The MOVE 
bombing captured the attention of the world, and as many 
law enforcement agencies weighed in on the actions of the 
Philadelphia police, so too did the media, both national and 
international.12
Front pages of many 
newspapers showed pictures of 
smoldering row houses in West 
Philadelphia.
The media took a largely critical view of the incident and 
Mayor Goode. Many newspapers around the world were 
unsympathetic to the siege of the MOVE house and called 
Philadelphia a “war zone.” Front pages of many newspapers 
showed pictures of smoldering row houses in West 
Philadelphia. The Washington Post referred to the pictures 
as resembling “war-torn Beirut” and the New York Daily 
News called the bombing “a terrible, unnecessary, and costly 
blunder.” The bombing attracted international attention 
with newspapers in France paying considerable attention 
to the incident. The France-Soir had an aerial photo of the 
devastation, and Liberation, a French tabloid, called it “one 
of the most unbelievable urban guerrilla operations that 
America has ever known.” In Moscow, a newscaster reported 
“six dead, 60 houses destroyed, hundreds homeless—such is 
the sinister result of a bloody slaughter which was launched 
by police.” The San Francisco Chronicle was extremely 
      11 Ron Wolf, William K. Marimow, Steve Lopez, and John Woestendiek, “How 
the Bomb Decision Was Made,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 17, 1985; Tom Infield, 
Doreen Carvajal, and Robert J. Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire: Sent Two 
Days Prior to Assault,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20, 1985; William K. Stevens, 
“Police Drop Bomb on Radicals’ Home in Philadelphia,” New York Times, May 14, 
1985.
   12 Tim Weiner, “Experts on Police Procedure Criticize Bombing of House,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 15, 1985.
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harsh in its criticism, writing there was “no excuse” for the 
bombing and it was “an astonishing example of overkill.” 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution was also critical, calling the 
bombing reckless and including comments from people such 
as Burton Caine, the president of the Philadelphia chapter of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, who called the bombing 
“totally unjustified,” and New York City mayor Edward 
Koch, who stated that “if [he] had a police commissioner 
so stupid to allow a bomb to be thrown into a house, [he] 
would remove him.” The Dallas Morning News focused on 
the residents of the 6200 block of Osage Avenue. Kevin 
Young called the bombing “unjustifiable” and said Osage 
Avenue “is not a battle zone.” Another resident said that he 
was “totally disgusted” with the city and how it had handled 
the crisis. These harsh comments about the administration 
and its actions were widespread after May 13, 1985 but only 
for a short period of time. The national news moved on after 
a few weeks of reporting on MOVE, and eventually only the 
Philadelphia Inquirer was doing any meaningful reporting on 
the aftermath of the bombing.13 
Despite all these critical reports, some newspapers were more 
supportive of Philadelphia and the mayor. The New York 
Times referred to MOVE as a radical group, focused more 
on the complaints from the neighbors against MOVE, and 
framed the incident as a city reacting against behavior that was 
well out of the norm for a working-class African American 
neighborhood. In the Times article, Dee Peoples, the owner of 
a store two blocks away from the MOVE house, said that “all 
you hear is aggression. You sleep with it, you wake up with it, 
you live with it.” The San Francisco Chronicle wrote about the 
group’s strange philosophy and how while it was, in theory, 
a “philosophy of anti-materialism, pacifism and concern for 
the environment,” in practice “its history was replete with 
violence, obscenity and filth.” The Chronicle article stated that 
former MOVE member Donald Glassey had testified John 
Africa “had planned an armed confrontation with police and 
had MOVE members make bombs and buy firearms.” The 
Lexington Herald-Leader, like the Times, described MOVE as 
a radical organization and defined the cause of the siege as 
MOVE refusing “to leave the house under an eviction order 
from police.” The Herald article also discussed neighbors’ 
complaints of “assaults, robberies, and a stench at the house.” 
The positive media surrounding the administration shielded 
it from dealing with the harsh realities of their actions and 
     13 Jane Eisner, “Media Blitz: West Philadelphia Disaster Makes Front-Page 
Headlines Around the World,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985; “Police 
Overkill,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; “Police Tactics Questioned 
– Experts Call Use of Explosives in Siege Situations ‘Reckless,’” Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, May 15, 1985; “225 Left Homeless by Philadelphia Fire – Uprooted 
Residents Sorrowful, Angry; Mayor Defends MOVE Incident,” Dallas Morning 
News, May 15, 1985.
allowed it a reprieve from the negative media of the bombing. 
The Philadelphia administration’s actions during this crisis 
were highly criticized and opinion was divided among news 
sources in the city and around the globe, but it was a much 
different story among the Philadelphia public.14
The national news moved on 
after a few weeks of reporting 
on MOVE.
Many believed they were receiving biased news reports. One 
woman from Valley Forge stated she “believed the mayor 
did a commendable job,” and “[the press was] questioning 
the mayor too much.” Tourists visiting Philadelphia in the 
aftermath of the bombing had a similar reaction: “MOVE? It 
could have happened anywhere.” One resident of Northeast 
Philadelphia, Eli Teper, complained the police “used too 
little force” and “criminals should be treated as such.” 
Steward Beatty, also of Northeast Philadelphia, thought the 
bombing was justified and it was “nice to see that somebody 
can still make decisions instead of doing nothing.” Steve 
Harmon, a resident of West Philadelphia, said the bombing 
was “like Vietnam.” While the media and the police around 
the country were divided on the incident, most people in 
Philadelphia appeared to see it as a tragedy but remained 
supportive of the mayor and the city overall.15
The media’s discussion about the incident shifted closer to 
the view of the public. While it was a tragedy, most blame 
rested on the shoulders of MOVE. Two days before the 
bombing, MOVE sent a letter threatening to set fire to their 
row house and the neighboring house should the police 
attack. This letter began, “If MOVE go down, not only will 
everyone in this block go down, the knee joints of America 
will break and the body of America will soon fall.” Then the 
letter threatened, “Before we let you mutha f-s [sic] make 
an example of us we will burn this mutha f-in [sic] house 
down and burn you all up with us.” The city administration 
began using the letter to blame MOVE for setting the fire 
that burned down sixty-one houses and killed eleven people. 
Police Commissioner Gregore Sambor stated it was his 
“personal opinion” that MOVE “started or assisted” the fire, 
and was “convinced that MOVE people saturated those roofs 
with gasoline.” Mayor Goode said the letter showed MOVE 
was “a group that was bent on absolute destruction, a group 
   14 Eisner, “Media Blitz”; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb”; “MOVE’s Strange 
Philosophy of Militancy and Escapism,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 15, 1985; 
“Radical Group Holds Police at Bay,” Lexington Herald-Leader, May 14, 1985.
       15  Joyce Gemperlein, “Visitors Say the City’s Image Will Survive,” Philadelphia 
Inquirer, May 19, 1985; Stevens, “Police Drop Bomb.”
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that was, in fact, a guerilla group inside an urban area.” The 
mayor also stated that the release of the letter was not meant 
as evidence that MOVE started the fire but that the letter 
“says what it says, in [his] opinion.”16
The city attempted to paint MOVE 
as the agressor, framing the 
actions they had undertaken as 
merely providing law and order.
In lockstep with the theory of MOVE burning down the 
street, the city began to discuss how the entry device used 
was extremely safe and could not have caused the fire. 
The explosive used in the bombing was known as Tovex 
TR-2, manufactured by the DuPont Company, which 
described Tovex TR-2 as “one of the safest explosives on 
the market.” Before the decision to use Tovex on the house, 
the Philadelphia Police Department secretly tested different 
explosives on lumber structures; however, Tovex TR-2 was not 
meant for above-ground buildings but was instead developed 
primarily for underground mining. The media began to use 
the DuPont Company’s label of Tovex as an extremely safe 
explosive to push the idea that the fire was not the fault of the 
city. Mayor Goode took issue with the word “bomb” as well, 
explaining that “what [he] approved to be used was an entry 
device, which was to take and somehow remove the bunker 
from the top of the house. There was no intent to destroy the 
house.” The city attempted to paint MOVE as the aggressor, 
thereby framing the actions they had undertaken as merely 
providing law and order, despite it being clear that the 
aggression towards MOVE was excessive.17
Shortly after the bombing, and amid calls for an official 
investigation into the administration’s actions, Mayor Goode 
announced his intentions to create a special commission to 
examine the incident. William J. Green, Mayor Goode’s 
predecessor, said the MOVE Special Commission “has 
serious, tough questions to ask [the] administration about how 
it conducted itself,” and “there are many, many unanswered 
questions and in some cases contradictions that cannot and 
should not and must not, if faith is to be restored, be swept 
under the rug.” The former mayor also said the city should 
release the police intelligence files on MOVE so “everyone 
in Philadelphia would know what the premise of [the] 
decisions were.” Despite Green’s harsh words on the city’s 
actions, Robert S. Hurst, then-president of Lodge 5 of the 
      16 Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened Fire.”
      17 Wolf, Marimow, Lopez, and Woestendiek, “How the Bomb Decision Was 
Made”; Infield, Carvajal, and Terry, “MOVE Letter Threatened.” 
Fraternal Order of Police, said “the ultimate responsibility of 
the widespread property destruction remains squarely on the 
members of this terrorist organization known as MOVE,” 
and public opinion in Philadelphia supported this idea. In 
a poll conducted by Teichner Associates of Philadelphia, 71 
percent of respondents believed the mayor did a good or 
excellent job dealing with MOVE.18
The MOVE Special Commission hired several people to
conduct the investigation. James R. Phelan, one of the FBI’s 
explosive and counterespionage experts before he left the 
bureau two years earlier, and Charles King, an expert in 
the cause and spread of fires, were brought in to investigate 
the explosives used in the bombing. The original report on 
the explosive device indicated the only explosive used was 
Tovex TR-2. However, three months after the incident, 
Officer William C. Klein testified he had included a second 
explosive, C-4, in the device when he had assembled it. The 
commission also hired six other investigators to work under 
the lead investigator, Neil P. Shanahan. These investigators 
came from Connecticut, Chicago, Virginia, and Maryland, 
as well as the Philadelphia area. William H. Brown III, 
chairman of the commission, said the “search for the 
highest-quality, professional investigators [was] long and 
wide-ranging.” Brown added these investigators brought “the 
skills and expertise essential for the investigation to fulfill 
its mandate.” The investigators specialized in anti-terrorist 
programs, major violent crime, and homicide. As the inquiry 
continued, it became very critical of how the city managed 
the MOVE incident.19
As the MOVE Commission’s hearings occurred, the 
testimonies began to paint Mayor Goode in an unflattering 
light. In his testimony, the mayor portrayed himself as 
misinformed and misled by his subordinates, claiming he was 
as much a victim as a leader. He depicted himself as a leader 
who confirmed the decisions others made. This was odd, as 
Goode’s managing style as both city manager and mayor was 
very detail oriented. An assistant to the District Attorney, 
Bernard L. Siegel, testified before the grand jury that he had 
heard “the mayor [say] to the police commissioner, ‘You are 
the professional and you need not keep me advised of all 
the details.’” When the District Attorney, Ed Rendell, was 
asked about this statement, he thought it was “somewhat 
unusual for Wilson [Goode]” before adding that the mayor’s 
“management style has always been to get involved in all 
the significant details.” The hearing revealed the mayor’s 
     18 Larry Eichel and Robin Clark, “MOVE Death Toll Reaches 11; Goode to 
Pick Panel for Probe,” Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 1985.
     19 Larry Eichel, “MOVE Commission Hires Former FBI Explosives Expert,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1985; Larry Eichel, “Commission Hires 6 
Investigators,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 19, 1985.
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attempts to distance himself from the MOVE incident as 
it was occurring by purposefully asking to not get all the 
details. This opened Goode up to considerable criticism, the 
most significant from former mayor William Green, who 
said Goode was pushing a theory of “reverse Nuremberg” 
responsibility: he could not be responsible for the incident 
because he had only accepted the recommendations from his 
subordinates. Charles Bowser, a member of the commission, 
criticized Goode in a less direct way, stating “the only 
person who had the foggiest notion of what was going to 
happen when the bomb dropped was a police lieutenant.” 
While these hearings demonstrated there was a major issue 
between MOVE and the other residents of the 6200 block 
of Osage Avenue, they also showed there had been poor 
communication, inaccurate or incomplete intelligence on 
the organization, and incompetent leadership.20
When the MOVE Special Commission reached a decision 
on the actions of the administration and the police, its 
report stated Mayor Goode and his administration displayed 
“reckless disregard for life and property.” The report 
stated, “dropping a bomb on an occupied row house was 
unconscionable and should have been rejected out of hand,” 
and “the plan to drop the bomb was reckless, ill-conceived, 
and hastily approved.” Commissioner Gregore Sambor and 
Managing Director Leo A. Brooks were declared “grossly 
negligent” for not calling off the siege. The report also 
called the mayor “grossly negligent” and said he “clearly 
risked the lives” of the children who had been killed in the 
house and this was “unjustified homicide.” The commission 
found that the mayor “failed to perform his responsibility 
as the city’s chief executive by not actively participating in 
the preparation, review, and oversight of the plan.” Goode 
“abdicated his responsibilities as a leader when, after midday, 
he permitted a clearly failed operation to continue [at] great 
risk to life and property.” Despite believing MOVE to be 
an “authoritarian, violence-threatening cult,” the report 
declared the 10,000 rounds of ammunition fired into the 
row house had been “excessive and unreasonable,” and “the 
failure of those responsible for the firing to control or stop 
such an excessive amount of force was unconscionable,” 
especially with children inside the building.21
Mayor Goode After MOVE
The MOVE Special Commission’s harsh criticisms of Mayor 
Goode were labeled as devastating by allies of the mayor, but 
the newspaper coverage of the report was largely supportive. 
    20 Larry Eichel, “D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details; Rendell Testifies on MOVE,” 
Philadelphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985. 
     21 Thomas Ferrick Jr., “Report on MOVE Finds Goode ‘Grossly Negligent’ in 
Decisions: Children’s ‘Homicide’ Is Alleged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 2, 1986.
An editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer, written shortly 
after the report was released, stated the author “[disagreed] 
with those who think Wilson Goode should resign” and 
noted Philadelphians should not just judge the mayor on 
the MOVE incident, but should instead “judge him on his 
entire first term.” Mayor Goode also received support from 
his church followers after the report. The Inquirer reported 
“more than 250 people […] gathered to pray for Mayor 
Goode,” and the Reverend U. O. Ifill Sr. described the 
prayer services as “a demonstration of the endemic support 
the mayor has in the black community.” Despite the findings 
of the MOVE Special Commission, Mayor Goode’s support 
in the city stayed strong and grew thanks to these efforts by 
local organizations and newspapers. This outcry of support 
for the mayor hid the actions he had taken and lessened the 
loss of life in the most important event of his career.22
Despite the findings of the MOVE 
Special Commission, Mayor 
Goode’s support in the city 
stayed strong.
In the years after the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode’s 
reputation began to recover. Over a year after the MOVE 
incident, Goode said that “[he] had some difficult days and 
difficult times in [his] administration, but [he had] done a 
lot of good, constructive things.” John F. White Jr., a city 
councilman, said “the administration has demonstrated far 
more experience over [the] year.” The incident faded from 
public memory, overshadowed by Goode’s more successful 
endeavors, such as ending a strike involving 14,000 city 
employees, which created more confidence in him and his 
administration. When the city experienced a major trash 
and sanitation issue, Mayor Goode proposed a trash-to-
steam plant to be built in the Philadelphia Navy Yard. When 
several police officers were arrested on bribery and corruption 
charges, Mayor Goode helped restore the department by 
implementing a reform package. In the initial aftermath of 
the MOVE disaster, it seemed that Goode’s political career 
was over, but over the following two years he worked tirelessly 
to repair his image.23
    22 Acel Moore, “Bringing on the Problems: Wilson Goode Sometimes Is His 
Own Worst Enemy,” Philadelphia Inquirer, March 20, 1986; Russell Cooke, 
“Praying for Goode: The Faithful Rise Up,” Philadelphia Inquirer, April 13, 1986. 
     23 Russell Cooke, “For Goode, A Year of Recovery,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 
January 4, 1987; Robin Clark, “Police Reforms Unveiled: Goode Begins Search 
for Chief,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 20, 1985; Ferrick Jr., “Report on 
MOVE.”
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In 1988, Goode ran for reelection against former mayor and 
police commissioner Frank Rizzo. It was a highly contested 
election, with only a slim margin of 17,176 votes out of 
652,307 total votes. In Rizzo’s concession, he warned Goode 
that he would “have to deliver or [he is] going to be right 
on him.” Despite the bad publicity that his actions against 
MOVE had brought him, the good publicity he had received 
since allowed Goode to rehabilitate his image and beat Rizzo 
to become mayor for his second term.  Goode’s reelection 
shows how successfully MOVE and the MOVE bombing 
had been removed from the public eye; even though nothing 
truly changed after the bombing, people had moved on.24 
Thirty Years Later
Thirty years after the MOVE bombing, National Public 
Radio looked back at MOVE and learned that many young 
Philadelphians never even knew it had occurred. Tasneema 
Raja, an editor on an NPR show who grew up only twenty 
minutes north of Philadelphia, never learned about MOVE 
in class but instead learned about it from her father. 
NPR’s Gene Demby, who grew up in South Philadelphia 
in the 1980s, also never discussed MOVE in class. Robin 
Wagner-Pacifici, who studies fringe radical groups at New 
York City’s New School, believes that other radical groups 
never identified with MOVE’s anti-technology, pro-animal 
rights, and quasi-Rastafarian beliefs, leading the group to be 
forgotten in discussions of radical groups. Groups similar to 
the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, and the Weaver family 
in Ruby Ridge, Idaho, held overlapping beliefs and would 
mention each other in their manifestos, but “none of them 
mentioned MOVE.” Unlike the Branch Davidians who 
faced off against the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms, or the Weaver Family who were besieged by the 
FBI, the Philadelphia police department bombed MOVE. 
This was not a showdown between a fringe radical group and 
the federal government, but with the local government. A 
lack of connection between the general public and MOVE’s 
core beliefs, as well as the city’s general ambivalence toward 
the group, caused the MOVE bombing to fade into obscurity. 
MOVE generally has only one article written on it each year, 
usually on the anniversary of the bombing or about the 
MOVE 9, and only receives minor mention in articles about 
events the group attends. This relative obscurity compared 
to the other extremist groups has caused the fallout of the 
bombing to be forgotten.25
     24 Christopher Hepp and H. G. Bissinger, “Rizzo Concedes Defeat: Says He’ll Remain 
Active in Politics,” Philadelphia Inquirer, November 24, 1987.
    25 Gene Demby, “I’m From Philly. 30 Years Later, I’m Still Trying to Make Sense of 
the MOVE Bombing,” National Public Radio, May 13, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-make-
sense-of-the-move-bombing. Gene Demby, “Why Have So Many People Never Heard o f 
the MOVE Bombing?” National Public Radio, May 18, 2015, https://www.npr.org/sections/
codeswitch/2015/05/18/407665820/why-did-we-forget-the-move-bombing.
Conclusion
Goode’s victory over Rizzo for a second term as mayor was 
the first sign that the MOVE incident held minimal lasting 
significance to the city outside of Osage Avenue. The second 
sign was that schools in Philadelphia do not teach about 
MOVE; children living in Philadelphia do not learn about 
an event where the mayor bombs his own city. The MOVE 
bombing should have ended Wilson Goode’s political career, 
as well as the careers of the others involved in the decision-
making that led to the siege of the MOVE row house and 
subsequent bombing of its bunker. This should have been an 
event woven into the very fabric of the city; instead, it was 
forgotten—the perpetrators remained in office and repaired 
their image, and their victims faded into obscurity. Nothing 
significant changed after the MOVE bombing: there were no 
major changes to policy or regulations in response to MOVE 
or police actions, and for the residents of Osage Avenue all 
they received was a city bombing their homes.26
This should have been an event 
woven into the very fabric of the 
city; instead, it was forgotten.
The MOVE bombing is an enormous black spot in the 
history of Philadelphia, and yet its occurrence is rarely, if 
ever, mentioned. That the bombing held no lasting impact 
in the psyche of Philadelphia is an affront to the deaths of 
those eleven MOVE members. Despite two grand juries 
on the bombing, no one from the city administration ever 
faced any consequences resulting from their part in burning 
down sixty-one houses and killing eleven people, five of 
them children. The city administration did their best to 
rehabilitate their image and move past the bombing without 
suffering any consequences, aside from a lawsuit paid to 
the surviving MOVE members. Reports of the MOVE 
bombing began as highly critical but over time became 
supportive, enabling the administration to shift the blame 
for the bomb and subsequent fire onto MOVE, eventually 
leading to the reelection of Wilson Goode and allowing 
the MOVE bombing to become largely forgotten. That the 
MOVE bombing left no major lasting effect on the city of 
Philadelphia is a disgrace and a disservice to those whose 
homes burned in the blaze and those who perished as a result 
of the city’s actions. 
     26 The homeowners on Osage Avenue had their homes rebuilt, but now most 
are abandoned due to shoddy reconstruction.
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Author’s Note
Charles Abraham (‘20) grad-
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ogy and Classical Studies. 
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Charles says that seeing 
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is “incredible”: “It means that all of my hard work paid off. 
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